Artistic License
Roman
Polanski is a rapist. Roman Polanski is a very talented writer and director of
films. (I, for one, much prefer his film version of The Ninth Gate to
the original novel by Arturo Perez-Reverte,
The Club Dumas.) But what do these two facts about Mr. Polanski have to do
with each other? How do they bear upon each other at all? Some seem to think
there is a relationship. To put it bluntly, the notion is this: extra credit
obtained via esthetic achievement (or talent) atones for demerits earned by
moral improprieties. He is a criminal and has hurt other people, but we can
give him a pass because he is so darn talented. That seems to be what Woody
Allen was thinking when he signed a petition urging leniency for Polanski.
That seems to have been Norman Mailer’s thinking when he managed to fish
convicted murderer Jack Henry Abbott, acclaimed
author of The Belly of the Beast out of jail, only to have his protégé
knife a waiter to death while Mailer was wining and dining the killer.
In his terrific morality play
Crimes and Misdemeanors, Woody Allen posed the dilemma of whether one is
to view the universe as possessing an inherent and objective moral structure
or whether, since the universe lacks it, we must do our best to build one
instead. I am guessing he has come down on the latter alternative, only he is
not trying very hard to build it, like O.J. Simpson doing his darnedest to
find his wife’s “real killer.” Allen has also expressed his ideology of moral
evasion by famously declaring, “The heart wants what it wants,” and thus, when
the wind changes, the mind and the conscience must give way to it. That would
explain the dreadful business with his girlfriend’s adoptive daughter. (You
remember the Soon-Yi mess.) My guess is that Woody Allen, Norman Mailer, and
many like them have, as philosophers say, placed the ethical beneath the
esthetic as a sub-classification. This is an error, I think. It defines the
“good life” as the beautiful or enjoyable life, and when people go astray
morally, what is said of them? “They live messy lives sometimes.” Like not
cleaning up your room. Like not putting away the dishes.
This evasion is cousin to the
cognitivist reduction of morality to misjudgments, like aiming to get
the empty can into the garbage can across the room, and it falls short. Oops!
Accordingly, politicians “confess” their corruptions and adulteries with the
butt-covering mantra, “I made a mistake.” It reduces the ethical to the
epistemic. “Mistakes” imply the crooked politician was unable, though doing
his best, to ascertain what was right. He just goofed when he had sex with
that staffer in his office with the door locked. He thought he was
doing the good and noble thing, but he made a “mistake.” Happens to the best
of us, I guess. We ought to look on his deed as Descartes or Shankara viewed
the man who saw the rope and flinched at an imagined snake. Back to the
drawing board!
Of course, sometimes we do our
best to find the moral path and we do fail. But then we learn from the results
and know better next time. We do not use it as a cherished all-purpose excuse.
It is one thing to say that we
may mistake certain cases, certain choices, for ethical ones when they are
not. That is the error of fundamentalist zealots who believe the truth of
their creed is so self-evident that your seeming failure to grasp it really
denotes your refusal to admit the truth, since, if you did, you would have no
excuse for not repenting. A legitimate difference of opinion has been
reassigned to the moral sphere, and you are culpable for “suppressing the
truth in unrighteousness.” Or those Muslim barbarians (literally, as you will
see) who gunned down men in Baghdad barbershops for daring to get
Western-style haircuts! A matter of esthetic (stylish) preference became a
matter of a capital crime. Or think of the poor Jehovah’s Witness kid who is
told it is a sin to celebrate her birthday.
To reduce morality to something
else is to seek to evade moral culpability, and it is therefore to eschew
moral seriousness. Often such cowardice is transformed into a supposed virtue
(an odd candidate for the status!) with the collectivist, field-leveling
formula that we have witnessed “the death of heroes,” or that we ought to shy
away from individualism and abdicate judgment to the “community.” Such a
community will perforce be a community of evasion and denial, seeking warmth
and strength in numbers, the numbers of branded cows in a herd. Seeking to
bear the same brand as the other cows, no matter what it is, so long as it is
the same as the brand one’s neighbor bears.
Naturally, it would be a
ludicrous error to damn and boycott the esthetic works of artists who have
failed morally. This is because of what Roland Barthes called “the death of
the author.” A work of art speaks for itself and is in the most decisive sense
its own author. It is finally self-referential. The human author whose name
appears on it has, as he or she knows as well as I do, only been privileged to
function as the expressive channel for artistic gifts given to him, to no
credit of his own, by heredity and nurture. It doesn’t matter who wrote that
“Woody Allen” or “Norman Mailer” or “Roman Polanski” piece. You don’t
fingerprint the text or the film. But you do fingerprint the artist if he has
committed rape or some other outrage. To do otherwise, as Woody wants to do,
implies a sickening moral nihilism.
So says Zarathustra.
Robert M. Price
October 2009